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Governor Stassen suggested that it might be desirable for the Administration to issue a laconic, factual account of the entire missile development in the United States. This might be published some time between now and next January. This would help to correct the unfortunate impression provided by photographs of missile failures, which photographs had distorted the truth of our real progress in this field. Within the limits of security, we should do our best to counteract this distortion.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the OCB was concerning itself with publicity on the missiles program, and was even now preparing a proposal for the President's consideration.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed a report by the Department of Defense on (1) the readjustment of ballistic and aerodynamic missile programs since the July 3, 1957, presentation to the Council on the subject (NSC Action No. 1743); and (2) the study of combining the THOR and JUPITER development programs into a single missile program, as called for by NSC Action No. 1765.
- b. Noted the President's approval of the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, contained in a-(1) above, that, because the various factors to be considered do not in total clearly favor the selection of one program at this time, both the THOR and JUPITER programs be continued until successful flight tests are achieved by either missile, in order that greater assurance of the early availability of an operable missile system may be achieved.
- c. Noted the President's instructions to the Department of Defense that, in approving the recommendation in b above:
 - (1) He would expect the Department of Defense to keep under constant study the most effective organizational structure for the IRBM and ICBM programs, including the possibility of concentrating such programs outside of the military services in one organization similar to the wartime Manhattan District; and, if deemed desirable as a result of such constant study, to make recommendations thereon to him.
 - (2) The overriding objective of the IRBM program, in view of the political and psychological impact referred to in NSC Action No. 1484-g, continues to be the successful achievement of an IRBM with approximately 1500 miles range and reasonable

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